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INTRODUCTION

An air of discomfort has always permeated discussions about race.
Because egalitarian ideals are very much in the eye of the beholder,
reasoned discourse is further complicated.' Tax and tax policy are not
free of these strictures. Accordingly, we have taken a decidedly
utilitarian view of Latinos and taxation in order to remove these
strictures and reduce the discomfort associated with the race issue.
In addition to an intrinsic moral component, fairness also has a
utilitarian purpose with respect to taxation-a fair system facilitates tax
collection. A tax system must be at least perceived as fair by the
taxpaying public in order to withstand the public's scrutiny and, by
extension, to encourage the public's willing compliance.2 While the
concept of fairness in taxation is an elusive one, the basic proposition
that fairness matters seems unassailable. If this is the case, an equally
unassailable proposition is that the system of taxation should be racially
and ethnically neutral. The corollary is that collection is impaired to the
extent a system is perceived as unfair.
Arriving at the answer to the question as to what is fair or what is
racially and ethnically neutral is not an easy task. For example, John
Stuart Mill's exposition of the relationship between justice and utility
used taxation as an example for demonstrating how one method of
justice can vary widely from another. He observed that while one could
argue that everybody should be taxed the same amount, another could
assert that justice required "graduated taxation" on a theory that those
with greater wherewithal are better able to part with greater amounts of
wealth without suffering detriment.
More than ten years ago, in their influential piece, A Black Critique
of the Internal Revenue Code,4 Professors Beverly Moran and William
Whitford questioned whether the Internal Revenue Code (Code) was, in
fact, racially neutral with respect to African Americans. Their surmise
was that a number of key provisions in the Code treated AfricanAmerican taxpayers differently than their White counterparts. In
particular, the Moran-Whitford study concluded that certain key Code
provisions created benefits that were outside the reach of many African
1. Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329, 365
(2009) (an incisive and biting commentary about those whose otherwise sound judgment
appears clouded when issues of race arise).
2. Leo P. Martinez, The Problem with Taxes: Fairness,Tax Policy, and the Constitution,
31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 414 (2004); Joseph Sneed, The Criteriaof Federal Income Tax
Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567-69 (1965).
3.

Martinez, supra note 2, at 415-16 (citing JOHN S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 102 (Roger

Crisp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1863)).
4. See generally Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal
Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 751.
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Americans because of socioeconomic, educational, and cultural
differences.
Since Professors Moran and Whitford published their work, a
number of scholars have undertaken critical examinations of the Code
that deal with some underrepresented groups.5 Curiously, no such
examination has comprehensively addressed Latinos and the Code.6 Our
hope is to address at least part of that deficiency.
We take pains to emphasize that it is not our intent to merely replace
the word "Latino" for "African American" in A Black Critique of the
Internal Revenue Code. Accordingly, this piece will proceed along
several lines. In Part I we begin with an introduction to the federal
income tax system and basic tax policy. In Part II we describe how
relative economic circumstances can affect how individual taxpayers
are treated under the Code. In Part III we observe that even in cases of
equal economic circumstances, behavioral and cultural differences
among Latinos result in different treatment under the Code. In this Part,
we examine the application of the Code in the context of several areas
in which Latinos are treated substantially different than other racial or
ethnic groups. We bring into focus the shortcomings of public policy as
implemented by the Code. In Part IV, we explain that education has a
substantial effect on a taxpayers' likelihood of taking advantage of the
Code, and suggest that it can play an important role in mobilizing the
Latino community. Our goal is to encourage further examination of the
5. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, HeterosexualPrivilege and the InternalRevenue Code, 34
U.S.F. L. REv. 465, 466 (2000) (noting various ways in which the Internal Revenue Code
disadvantages homosexuals); Mylinh Uy, Tax and Race: The Impact on Asian Americans, 11
ASIAN AM. L.J. 117, 124 (2004). Professor David Brennen has neatly surveyed related literature.
See David Brennen, Race and EqualityAcross the Law School Curriculum, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC.
336, 337 n.5 (2004).
6. One reason Professors Moran and Whitford began their examination with AfricanAmericans was because they perceived data was more widely available for this group. Moran &
Whitford, supra note 4, at 754. They expressed the desire to extend their study to other racial
and ethnic groups. Id. Professor Alice Abreu, among others, has urged such an inquiry and has
highlighted the tax system's role in achieving distributional equity and wealth distribution. Alice
G. Abreu, Tax Counts: BringingMoney-Law to LatCrit,78 DENV. U. L. REv. 575, 577 (2001).
Our use of the term Latino refers to American citizens and undocumented residents who trace
their ancestry principally to Spanish-speaking Latin American countries. This repeats the
practice by one of the authors in a prior work. See Miguel Mendez and Leo Martinez, Toward A
StatisticalProfile ofLatinos in the Legal Profession, 13 BERKELEY LA RAzA L.J. 59, 60 n.6 (2002).
We also note that the term Latino describes a widely diverse group that may well defy
categorization in cultural terms save for the most obvious trait of sharing the common language of
Spanish. We acknowledge that the term Latino may be at once overinclusive and underinclusive.
We also note the data cited in this article at times appeared in the original under the heading
"Hispanic."
7. As is plain from the text below, we are aided in our quest by a number of scholars
who have done comprehensive studies of particular aspects of the Code. See supra text
accompanying note 5 & infra text accompanying note 8.
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problems that we raise, with the ultimate hope that policy-makers will
realize that the Code is less than perfect, and that Latinos, with their
increasing political clout, will be aware of the powerful economic
consequences of seemingly neutral legislation.8

I. A TAX AND

TAX POLICY PRIMER

We begin by outlining the federal income tax system and we follow
with a discussion of tax policy principles. Understanding the basics of
the federal tax system provides a needed background to understanding
its role in connection with Latino realities in America.
A. The FederalIncome Tax System
The American federal tax system can be seen as stultifyingly
complex-Albert Einstein is credited with observing that, "the hardest
thing to understand in the world is the income tax." At the same time,
the rough contours of the tax system are relatively simple.
To begin, the federal tax system, as embodied in the Code, applies to
all persons who are citizens or residents of the United States or to
anyone who has U.S.-sourced income.10 This includes all citizens of the
United States, certain persons who are physically present in the United
States, whether documented or undocumented, and persons who are not
physically present in the United States but who invest in U.S.-sourced
activities.
The federal system of income taxation is based on the concept of
"gross income." The Code very broadly defines gross income as "all
income from whatever source derived." 1 2 This broad definition is
further expanded by a sweeping construction of the term under existing
U.S. Supreme Court decisions as "accessions to wealth, clearly realized,
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion."l 3 Gross income
8. A number of tax scholars have striven for greater awareness of the effects of the Code
and any tax system on the citizenry. Marjorie Kornhauser, Educating Ourselves Towards a
Progressive (and Happier) Tax, 45 B.C. L. REv. 1399, 1407 (2004); see generally Edward J.
McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1861 (1994). Professor McCaffrey
observes that framing-how an issue is presented-can have dramatic effects. Id. at 1915.
9. Tax Quotes, Internal Revenue Service, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=
110483,00.html (May 20, 2011).
10. I.R.C. § 1 (2011) (imposing the federal income tax on all "individuals").
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.1-l(b) (2011) (describing individuals subject to tax including resident
aliens); see Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate,
Unequal, and Without Representation,9 HARv. LATINo L. REv. 1, 7 n.26 (2006).
12. I.R.C. § 61 (2011).
13. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955), reh'g denied, 349
U.S. 925 (1955).
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is then used to calculate taxable income, the base on which a taxpayer's
tax liability is computed. The tax liability, or tax burden, is the final
amount of tax that must be paid.
A taxpayer's tax burden can be reduced by: (1) exclusions from
gross income, (2) deductions from gross income and (3) the system of
tax credits. 1 4 Each of these requires explanation.
Exclusions. The federal tax system contemplates a number of
exclusions from gross income. Certain kinds of gross income, although
constituting accessions to wealth, are simply not counted as gross
income by the Code.16 One of the most common exclusions is that for
the receipt of gifts or inheritances.' 7
Deductions. The federal tax system also contemplates a number of
deductions that reduce taxable income. Most deductions are essentially
expenditures that the U.S. Congress has enacted as part of the Code to
reduce taxable income. Deductions act to lower the tax burden by
reducing the amount of taxable income (the tax base) that is subject to
taxation. Several deductions are highlighted in the discussion that
follows.
Credits. The Code also contains a system of tax credits. These
credits are applied to a taxpayer's tax liability so as to reduce the tax
itself. Key credits, like the Earned Income Tax Credit and education
credits, are discussed below.
How this system of exclusions, deductions, and credits applies,
directly affects the amount of revenue collected by the federal
government and the amount of capital that individuals and entities are
permitted to retain. The system of exclusions, deductions, and credits
operates, in effect, as a kind of subsidy for each area affected by the
system.' 8 A few examples illustrate the principles and show how policy
goals are advanced.
By allowing a deduction for amounts paid to charity, for example,
the Code encourages and subsidizes private philanthropy. Similarly, by
allowing an exclusion from gross income for amounts paid into
qualified pension plans, the Code encourages individual retirement
14. This formulation is greatly simplified for illustrative purposes. The Code contains
myriad other tax preferences including, for example, preferential treatment of certain capital
gains.
15. To be sure this is a crude formulation. The Code also contains provisions which result
in preferential rates of taxation on certain kinds of income including capital gains and dividends.
I.R.C. § 1(h) (2011).
16. For example, gross income does not include compensation for injuries or sickness.
I.R.C. § 104 (2011).
17. I.R.C. § 102 (2011).
18. Carolyn V. Juarez, Liberty, Justice, and Insurance for All: Re-Imagining the
Employment-Based Health Insurance System, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 881, 885-86 (2004) (in
the health insurance area the subsidy amounts to over $100 billion in foregone revenue).
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savings. On the surface, this is simply the implementation of sound
social policy. Digging deeper, however, it could be seen that the
approach is flawed from a number of perspectives.' 9
Even without addressing the realities facing the Latino community
(which we refer to as "Latino realities"), the approach systematically
disadvantages low-income working people. Instead, it favors those who
are investors or employed by large businesses, resulting in an uneven
distribution of burdens and benefits. Because the various incentives
embodied in the Code (for example, philanthropy and pension savings
as discussed above) are implemented and encouraged by tax savings,
low-income individuals and the unemployed are ill-placed to take
advantage of deductions. 20 With low income levels to tax, deductions,
exclusions, and credits do little good for the poor. Similarly, the
working poor lack the wherewithal to save in qualified pension plans. 2 1
Especially with respect to pension plans, these provisions are poorly
targeted, that is away from those who already save the least for
retirement. Thus, however sound the public policy that underlies any
particular Code provision, actual implementation of such policy is often
of little use to the poor and the policy justification is obscured.
B. A Tax Policy Primer
Tax policy is an amorphous concept. While the Code's primary
purpose is to enable the collection of revenue and to implement fiscal
22
policy, it also functions to implement certain social goals as well. For
example, the deduction for the payment of qualified residence interest is
a way of encouraging home ownership. Home ownership, in turn,
promotes social responsibility and the creation of a citizenry more
attuned to the preservation of responsible government. 2 Without
quarreling with this policy itself, it can be seen as creating a tension
19. See id. at 902-03 (outlining limitations of tax incentives in connection to health
insurance).
20. We concede that philanthropy and charitable donations often benefit the poor and that
it can be argued that by encouraging benevolence, the Code is benefiting the poor indirectly.
21. It is possible, of course, for employers to contribute to pension plans. The sad reality,
however, is that this has become an infrequent phenomenon. See Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect
Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged Stool of Social Security, Pensions,and
Personal Savings, 91 MiNN. L. REv. 938, 948 (2007) (58% of pension plan participants are
covered only by a defined contribution plan, i.e., plans which are funded primarily by
employees themselves).
22. Martinez, supra note 2, at 415-16.
23. Uy, supra note 5, at 124 ("Congress' choice of favoring homeowners possibly
reflects the belief that people who own houses are more stable people."). Professor Alice Abreu
has also noted that the deduction for qualified residence interest can also foster the feeling of
empowerment. Abreu, supra note 6, at 582.
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between the implementation of a worthy social goal and the evenhanded treatment of citizens. We focus on two aspects of tax policy that
address this issue of "fairness" in the Code-first, horizontal, and
vertical equity, and second, benefit theory.
1. Horizontal and Vertical Equity
Most tax policy theorists at least pay lip service to the idea of
horizontal equity. The principle of horizontal equity posits that those
who are similarly situated should be treated equally by any system of
taxation. 24 This is seemingly not a hard case to make. If I make $100 in
one year and my neighbor also makes $100 in the same year, it only
seems "natural" or "fair" that if we are taxed by the same system we
should pay the same in taxes. It should come as no surprise that the
principle of horizontal equity is advanced as a foundation stone of any
rational and fair system of taxation.2 5
The only difficulty is that when applied, the principle of horizontal
equity can lead to results that seem to be unfair. This unfairness can
stem from several different kinds of causes, each of which can be seen
as a variant of the unfortunate truth of the Anatole France description of
law as having that "majestic quality . .. which prohibits the wealthy as

well as the poor from sleeping under the bridges, from begging in the
streets, and from stealing bread."2 6 France recognized that any kind of
law which purported to be neutral in its application to a population
might affect certain citizens in different ways.27 To be sure, laws that
are, for instance, seemingly race-neutral can be applied differentially in
a decidedly race-based manner. 28 To make the obvious point, the rich
24. See Martinez, supra note 2, at 422.
25. See, e.g., General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, H.R. CONF. REP. No.
99-841, pt. 2, at 7 (1986) (Conf. Rep.) (primary objective is to ensure that individuals with
similar income pay similar amounts of tax); Senate Finance Committee Report on the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, S. Rep. No. 97-494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 97
(1982) (Act is designed to improve tax equity); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE,
PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 5-6 (2d ed. 1973) ("[T]ransfer policies [distributions
between wealthy and poor] remain of major importance"); JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX

POLICY 5 (5th ed. 1987) ("A distinct policy objective of the federal taxation schemes is the
distribution function"); JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVEs: A CITIZEN's GUIDE
TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAx REFORM 51 (2d ed. 2000) ("Fairness . . . deserves close

scrutiny because much of the bewildering complexity of the tax law is justified in its name.").
26. ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYs ROUGE (The Red Lily) ch. VII, p. 49 (1894). Anatole
France won the 1921 Nobel Prize in Literature. For an excellent explication of historical relief
mechanisms for the poor, see Larry Cata Backer, Medieval Poor Law in Twentieth Century
America: Looking Back Towards a General Theory of Modern American Poor Relief 44 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 871, 953-65 (1995).
27.

FRANCE, supra note 26.

28.

For a good example, see Professor Michael Olivas's citation of Professor Pat Chew
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and the poor were, in France's world, subject to the same limitation on
their behavior-neither could steal a crust of bread. The law could be
seen as fair in this regard. France's genius was to recognize that this
"equal" treatment bore upon the poor with more harshness than the rich.
The principle of vertical equity would seem to account for France's
objection. Vertical equity refers to the equitable treatment of taxpayers
with unequal incomes.29 The poor, not being similarly situated with the
rich, can justifiably be treated differently-presumably with a lesser
rate of taxation. So it is with the Code, which generally taxes the high
amounts of taxable income at higher rates than lower amounts of
taxable income.
The principles of horizontal and vertical equity have limitations.
Horizontal and vertical equity seem to be defined solely in economic
terms. However, as one prominent scholar has observed, the focus on
economic circumstances in analyzing the fairness of the Code should
not cause us to overlook non-economic considerations in such
analysis. 3 ' Much like Anatole France, Professors Moran and Whitford
contributed to the debate by observing that African Americans are
systematically short-changed by the Code despite the absence of overt
discrimination and despite the principles of horizontal and vertical
equity. 32 In that spirit we proceed.
2. Benefit Theory
Another aspect of tax policy deserves attention as it relates to
"fairness"-the benefit theory of taxation. Benefit theory posits that
there is, or at least there should be, some relationship between taxes
paid and benefits received.3 3 For example, many property tax regimes
fund schools. Thus, resistance to property taxes is often found in
neighborhoods where an aging population resides and where there are
relatively few school-aged children.
and Robert Kelly's study demonstrating systematic racial bias in the outcomes of discrimination
claims. Michael A. Olivas, The Tenth Annual Frankel Lecture: Commentary: Reflection on
Academic Merit Badges and Becoming an Eagle Scout, 43 Hous. L. REv. 81, 86 (2006) (citing
Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, UnwrappingRacialHarassmentLaw, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. (2006)).
29. Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REv. 1191, 1193 (2008).
30. I.R.C. § 1 (rates of taxation on high incomes are higher than for low incomes).
31. Infanti, supra note 29, at 1196.
32. Moran & Whitford, supra note 4.
33. Donna M. Byrne, Locke, Property,and ProgressiveTaxes, 78 NEB. L. REv. 700, 72830 (1999). Professor Joe Dodge's work is mandatory reading on the subject. See generally
Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and
Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REv. 399 (2005) (discussing, in considerable depth, the
author's criticisms of benefit theory).
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The benefit theory of taxation has its limitations. A significant
problem is that the amount of benefits received relative to the taxes paid
can be difficult to measure. 34 The value of benefits, such as clean air
and safe streets, are at best difficult to quantify. 35 Moreover, the poor
likely derive greater benefit from publicly funded programs that simply
are not needed by the rich. These can include public transportation, food
assistance programs, and schools.36 Taxpayers also might receive
benefits that they simply do not need or want. Finally, it can be argued
that the rich derive greater benefit from programs, such as national
defense, that entrench the wealthy and powerful elite, though the
valuation of such benefits would be at best speculative. 3 8
All of this is not to say that benefit theory is not useful at some level.
The utility of benefit theory is demonstrated in the context of Latinos'
relationship with the Code. A large proportion of the Latino population
in the United States is represented by the undocumented.3 9 It was
reported for tax year 2006 that undocumented taxpayers seemed to be
filing federal tax returns in record numbers.40 However, many
undocumented residents, despite the payment of taxes, do not seek or
are barred from receiving many government benefits. Professor
Francine Lipman includes among her list of benefits unavailable to the
undocumented: "food stamps, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families, Medicaid, federal housing programs, Supplemental Security
Income, Unemployment Insurance, Social Security, Medicare, and the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)."4 1 Indeed, as of 1996, federal law
has explicitly disqualified undocumented immigrants from receiving
most federal public benefits. 42 A simple application of benefit theory,
34. See Byrne, supra note 33, at 731-33.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 728-30.
37. Id. at 731-33.
38. In the same way state and local taxes fund fire and police protection which arguably
also entrench the wealthy.
39. The overwhelming majority of the almost 14 million undocumented U.S. residents
are Latino.

JEFFREY S.

PASSEL,

ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE

UNDOCUMENTED POPULATION 1-2 (2005), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/44.pdf (a Pew

study says about 81%: Mexico (57%) and other Latin American countries (24%)); see also
Lipman, supra note 11, at 9-10. By comparison, there were nearly 42 million Latinos in the
United States in 2005. Hispanics at Mid-Decade-Table 1. Population by Race and Ethnicity:
2000 and 2005, PEw HISPANIC CENTER (Sept. 2006), http://pewhispanic.org/files/2006/08/

complete.pdf [hereinafter Hispanics].
40. Nina Bernstein, Tax Returns Rise for Immigrants in US. Illegally, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
16, 2007), availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/16/nyregion/16immig.html.
41. Lipman, supra note 11, at 5-6.
42. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. This
act also authorized states to adopt similarly restrictive eligibility requirements for programs of
general cash public assistance fumished under state law. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1624(a)-(b) (2006).
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whatever its limitations, leads to the conclusion that despite the payment
of what some estimate to be billions in sales, excise, property, income,
and payroll taxes,4 3 the undocumented receive little in return. We
explore this further below.
As noted, benefit theory has significant shortcomings. We use it only
in the way described by Professor Joseh Dodge, as an intuitive tool
motivated by our desire for social equity. In any society in which there
are disparities in wealth and income, it seems self-evident that the poor
will, or at least should, generally contribute less in taxes than they
receive in basic social services. Thus, the assessment of taxes on the
undocumented coupled with the denial of social services seems to turn
this concept on its head.45 Benefit theory, in this instance, is a crude tool
that nonetheless highlights a basic inequity.
3. A Critique of Tax Policy Critiques
A nuanced critique of tax policy critiques is offered by Professor
Lawrence Zelenak, who questions whether critiques of the fairness of
the Internal Revenue Code essentially take a too narrow and a too
purposely selective view by choosing only those Code provisions that

Even so the Code also treats U.S. taxpaying residents with families who reside outside of the
United States in a different way. I.R.C. § 152(b)(3)(A) (2011) (denying the deduction for
dependents if the dependent is not a citizen and not a U.S. resident).
43. See Francine J. Lipman, Bearing Witness to Economic Injustices of Undocumented
Immigrant Families: A New Class of "Undeserving" Working Poor, 7 NEV. L.J. 736, 750-51
(2007) (discussing that unauthorized workers pay billions of dollars annually for Social Security
taxes, even though these workers do not qualify for Social Security Benefits). Professor Lipman
noted "In 2003, the government collected an estimated seven billion dollars in Social Security
and Medicare taxes, or approximately one percent of overall revenue, from 7.5 million workers
and their employers with mismatched SSNs." Id. The payment of taxes by the undocumented is
attributable to several reasons. See Bernstein, supra note 40, at Al. These include the simple
fact of withholding, they believe that it is right, they want to establish a paper trail in case of
immigration reform, or they want the refund because they are able to claim dependents outside
the United States. Id.
44. Dodge, supra note 33, at 418. As Professor Dodge eloquently stated:
There is another level of public discourse, which consists of direct appeals to
intuition or values. On this level, the new benefit principle easily might be
embraced by those who have some sympathy for a meaningfully redistributive
function of government, but who cannot really articulate it beyond a general
charitable impulse or sense of social "fairness."
Id.
45. See Lipman, supra note 11, at 8. Professor Francine Lipman's take is that "the high
effective tax rate imposed on the poorest undocumented working families relative to their less
unfortunate friends and neighbors is inconsistent with fundamental tax policy." Id.
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advance a particular point of view. 46 He baldly states: "Within the
critical tax movement, there is a reward for examining a tax provision
and finding it guilty of hidden discrimination; there is no reward for
discovering a provision is innocent. 4 7
Professor Zelenak makes a defensible point to the effect that (1)
some critiques of the Code uncritically assume that the income tax is a
neutral baseline and (2) that the Code provisions that disadvantage one
racial group might be offset by Code provisions that advantage that
same group.48 Nonetheless, we persist in believing that highlighting
racial inequities in the Code is a useful task because exposing racial
inequalities is the best avenue for promoting discourse with respect to
whether such inequalities can in fact be justified.
We persist in our task for two further reasons. First, a neutral
baseline does not necessarily result in a fair tax structure. For example,
we hope no one would disagree with the notion that it would be unfair
to tax women based on a rate schedule that was ten percent higher than
the rate schedule for men, regardless of whether the income tax base is
neutral. In the same way, a similar reaction might follow a more
nuanced examination of certain Code provisions that are overall neutral
but benefit or burden certain groups over others.
Second, we acknowledge the possibility that Code provisions that
disfavor one ethnic group over another may mask a grand design so that
46.
1522-23
47.
48.
question

Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1521,
(1998).
Id. at 1578.
Id. at 1562. In commenting on our work, Professor Leandra Lederman raises the
of why it isn't the overall result that matters. She writes:
For example, if Code sec. X provides that women have $500 of extra gross
income, but Code sec. Y allows only women a $500 above-the-line deduction,
presumably Code sec. X is not unfair, because its result is undone by sec. Y. It
would be misleading to look just at sec. X in the abstract. My example is of
course artificial. I think a good rebuttal is that absent a situation where one
Code section neatly undoes the effect of another, looking at the effects of the
Code overall still might a disproportionate impact. For example, if some Code
sections favor married couples and others favor unmarried couples, is the Code
neutral as to marriage? Not necessarily. It depends on the amounts of benefits
and burdens, as well as whether subsets of each group disproportionately
benefit or are burdened. For example, it could be that all the marriage penalty
provisions apply to elderly couples, so the Code encourages marriage only late
in life. That would not be neutral as to marriage for any couple, even if, overall,
the Code penalized some couples by the same amount it benefited other
couples.

E-mail from Leandra Lederman, William W. Oliver Professor of Tax Law, Indiana Univ. Sch.
of Law (Bloomington), to Leo P. Martinez, Professor of Law, Hastings Coll. of Law (Feb. 19,
2008) (on file with authors).
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these Code provisions are balanced out by other Code provisions that
favor the same ethnic group-the idea being that the different
treatments even out in the wash as a sort of rough justice. Professor
Zelenak suggests that the Earned Income Tax Credit-the EITC-may
be one such Code provision that serves to balance the possible
inequities created by other Code inequities. 49 We concede that,
assuming a random distribution of favorable and unfavorable Code
provisions, this idea may even be demonstrable. Our intuition, however,
is that the distribution of favorable and unfavorable Code provisions is
far from random and that there is no meaningful counterbalancing of
Code inequities. However attractive the idea that there is a
counterbalancing of Code equities might seem, certainly, no articulation
of this idea has found a voice in the enactment of any Code provision.
We leave to others the task of showing our intuition is not well-founded.

II. THE CODE AND

THE POOR

The structure of the Code disadvantages the poor in a number of
systematic respects. Because some of the disadvantages are not readily
apparent, we discuss several examples that illustrate the problem.
First, studies have shown that the poor make charitable contributions
at rates equal to or exceeding those with substantially higher incomes.so
Under the Code, taxpayers whose aggregate deductions do not exceed a
threshold amount-the standard deduction-are effectively denied the
benefit of the charitable deduction." The wealthy, even though they
may give at a rate lower than the poor, are able to use the charitable
deduction because their aggregate deductions will exceed the standard
deduction. In effect, the Code rewards the wealthy for their
philanthropic impulses while effectively denying the benefits of the
Code to the poor for their philanthropy.
49. Zelanak, supra note 46, at 1568.
50. See Alms From the Working Class, PORTFOLIO.COM, http://www.portfolio.com/
graphics/2008/02/Alms-From-the-Working-Class (last visited July 31, 2011). See also Russel N.
James III & Deanna L. Sharpe, The Nature and Causes of the U-Shaped Charitable Giving
Profile, NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. (June 2007), http://nvs.sagepub.com/cgi/
content/abstract/36/2/218. See generally Patterns of Household Charitable Giving by Income
Group, CENTER ON PHILANTHROPY IND. UNIv. 1, 15 (2007).

51. See I.R.C. § 63(b) (2011) (providing for the standard deduction if a taxpayer does not
"itemize" deductions); id. (c) (describing the standard deduction). See also I.R.C. § 170
(describing the charitable deduction).
52. See generally Lynnley Browning, Senate's Tax Bill Includes Incentives for Charity
Gifts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at A21; C. Eugene Steuerle, President Bush's Proposal to
Encourage Charitable Giving: Statement Before the United States Senate Committee on
Finance,URBAN INST. (Jan. 1, 2001), http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID-900325.
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Second, the Code is structured generally for wage earners as a payas-you-go system through employers withholding taxes based on
earnings.53 By contrast, those who derive their income from investment
are not subject to withholding of taxes on investment income (e.g.,
interest, dividends, capital gains, rental income). 54 Furthermore, those
who derive their income from investment are much more likely to be
wealthy.5 5 Therefore, one can reasonably conclude that the Code is
structured in a manner that disproportionately favors the rich.
Not only do the wealthy who do pay their taxes receive more
benefits than the poor, the wealthy who do not pay their taxes often fare
better than the poor who do not. This argument is especially important
for undocumented workers who do not file their taxes for fear of
immigration authorities. Therefore, a low-income person may well
overpay her taxes if she does not jump through all the challenging and
potentially expensive hoops of preparing a tax return and filing it. These
challenges are more significant for those who suffer language and
cultural barriers, lack of professional contacts, and often a paralyzing
fear of government. Thus, the suspicion is that the many millions
(maybe even billions) of dollars from unpaid refunds every year likely
should go to low-income individuals. By contrast, a higher-income
person with investment income that is not offset by deductions will
underpay if they do not file because they have not been paying on
income as they go. It is possible that such underpayments might not be
detected as they are not the subject of withholding by employers or
information reporting.
A final example of the treatment of the poor is the deduction for
qualified home mortgage interest paid. If a taxpayer owns a personal
residence, the interest paid on the mortgage used to acquire the
residence results in a tax deduction which reduces the amount of tax
that must be paid. 56 If a taxpayer, whether by personal choice or by
economic circumstance, rents a personal residence, that payment, even
if it approximates the interest that might be paid on a mortgage, does
not provide for a deduction. As Professors Moran and Whitford
observed, this has the effect of favoring those who can qualify for credit
53. I.R.C. § 31 (2011) (allowing a credit for tax withheld on wages); I.R.C. § 3401 (2011)
(defining wages); I.R.C. § 3402 (2011) (requiring employers to withhold taxes on wages).
54. To be fair, such individuals are required to make estimated payments of income tax.
I.R.C. § 6654 (2011) (requiring individuals to pay estimated tax). The amount of estimated tax
required to be paid is the lesser of 90% of the tax liability shown on the return for the current
year, or 100% of the tax liability shown on the return for the preceding year. I.R.C. § 6654(d)
(2011).
55. Jonathan Barry Forman, Making America Work, 60 OKLA. L. REv. 53, 60 (2007)
("Relatively few well-off households receive the lion's share of this nation's investment
income.").
56. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (2011) (describing qualified residence interest).
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and who can afford, using borrowed funds, to purchase a personal
residence. To the extent a taxpayer cannot so qualify for credit, the tax
benefit, in the form of the deduction for qualified personal residence
interest, is simply not available. We develop this idea in greater detail
below.
The preceding examples serve to underscore how the poor fare under
the Code. To be sure, this results in unequal treatment of African
Americans and Latinos, who are overrepresented at the low end of the
income scale.5 7 The relationship of Latinos in the Code is more subtle
yet. Again, we rely on Professors Moran and Whitford.
Professors Moran and Whitford did not make a comprehensive
examination of the entire Code. This observation is not intended as a
criticism. Rather, we mention this limitation because we also follow
their approach. Because Professors Moran and Whitford aimed to
expose specific disparities, and recognized a dearth of reliable data, they
focused on four concrete areas of the Code. These areas included: (1)
benefits granted to wealth and wealth transfers, (2) the benefits of home
ownership, (3) employees benefits associated with pension plans, and
(4) the different tax rate treatment of single and married persons.58
Professors Moran and Whitford first relied primarily on economic
data that places African Americans, as a group, in the lower rungs of
wealth accumulation and income levels. Thus, they found that African
Americans are less apt to be the recipients of tax-favored gifts or
inheritances, 59 that African Americans were less likely to own their own
homes, 60 that African Americans had less ability to take advantage of
voluntary contribution pension plans,6 ' and that married African
Americans were more likely to consist of two wage-earners, they were
more subject to the so-called marriage penalty. 62 This approach
harmonizes with the examples we have set forth above.
Professors Moran and Whitford were careful in their conclusions.
Their examination of the four areas outlined above suggested that
African Americans' economic circumstances led to different treatment
under the Code in these four areas. As any careful researcher would do,
they did not attempt to extrapolate beyond the data they had. Indeed,
they made the pointed comment, "We cannot reach a conclusion about
57. See Barbara J. Robles, Tax Refunds and Microbusinesses: Expanding Family and
Community Wealth Building in the Borderlands,613 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 178
(Sept. 2007) (discussing low incomes among Latinos). See also Uy, supra note 5, at 121 (noting
that Latinos earn much less than Whites).
58. Moran & Whitford, supra note 4, at 755.
59. Id. at 772.
60. Id. at 776.
61. Id. at 787.
62. The Congress has since addressed the marriage penalty problem for low income
individuals. I.R.C. § 32(b)(3)(B).

2011]

THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND LATINO REALITIES: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE

391

whether the Internal Revenue Code as a whole is systematically biased
in favor of whites." 63 Nonetheless, their examination would lead the
casual reader to the inescapable conclusion that the Code systematically
discriminates against African Americans.6 4 Our own reading of their
work must necessarily agree with the notion that substantial disparate
treatment of African Americans under the Code exists despite the
facially neutral text of the Code. We believe that the Code also treats
Latinos in a disparate way.
III. LATINO REALITIES

Notwithstanding a reliance on economic circumstances, it is evident
that Professors Moran and Whitford were sensitive to the nuance that
economic circumstances do not necessarily explain everything. Here,
their contribution is more important. If their thesis had been that the
Code discriminates solely on the basis of differing economic
circumstances, it would be easy to dismiss based on the aspiration of the
American dream. That is, if we all work hard and apply ourselves
diligently, we can all take advantage of the Code-we can make taxfavored gifts, we can own our own homes, we can contribute to 401(k)
plans, and we can afford to have our spouses tend to the household. Our
aspirations can be limitless, transcending the achievement of middleclass status to an attainment of wealth equal to that of Bill Gates.6 5
Professors Moran and Whitford recognized that even if their
examination of the Code controlled for income levels, there nonetheless
remained disparities in the treatment of African Americans under the
Code. As they stated, "[E]ven at the same incomes, the typical black
and the typical white lead different lives, largely as a result of the
American history of racial subordination. These different lives, we
hypothesize, trigger different tax results." 66
Based on this view, it is hardly surprising that the preceding themes
are influenced by Latino realities. In this part, we look at the more
subtle effects of the Code on Latinos. Our examination necessarily
defines the Latino experience in the United States as different from the
African American experience.6 7 As it develops, our examination reveals
63. Moran & Whitford, supra note 4, at 754.
64. Professors Moran and Whitford were willing to say that their limited examination
made the hypothesis of systematic bias credible. Id. at 755.
65. As Professor Elizabeth Warren states: "The assumption that participation in the
middle class will solve other economic and social problems facing racial minorities is strong."
Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of Race: When Making It to the Middle is Not Enough, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1777, 1778 (2004).
66. Moran & Whitford, supra note 4, at 757.
67. Rachel F. Moran, What if Latinos Really Mattered in the Public Policy Debate?, 85
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that the differences are not always intuitive.
We have examined five different areas. They are the deduction for
personal residence interest, the Code benefits associated with pension
plans, the treatment of the undocumented, the tax benefits provided
under the Code for the pursuit of higher education, and the Earned
Income Tax Credit. We examine the first two in order to compare and
contrast with two of the areas touched on by Moran and Whitford. We
examine the last to test whether Professor Zelenak's suggestion that the
EITC serves to even out inequities in the Code is supported. In each
area, we show that Latino realities result in significant differences in the
way the Code deals with equally wealthy (or equally poor) but different
racial groups. 68
A. The Deductionfor PersonalResidence Interest
We start with the deduction for personal residence interest to provide
both a point of comparison and a point of departure from Professors
Moran and Whitford. The Code provides a deduction for the payment of
qualified home mortgage interest. 6 9 This deduction has the effect of
reducing the amount of a taxpayer's taxable income and, hence, income
tax liability.70 To the extent a taxpayer is wealthy enough, has sufficient
income, and has a sufficient credit rating to borrow funds, the taxpayer
can borrow money, at some rate of interest, to purchase a personal
residence. The payment of such interest could result in a tax deduction
that will reduce that taxpayer's tax liability-a considerable benefit. If a
taxpayer lacks the wealth, lacks sufficient income, or does not have a
credit rating high enough to justify borrowing an amount sufficient to
buy a home, that taxpayer might be forced to rent a residence. The
payment of rent, unfortunately, does not generate a tax deduction and
hence this residence-based benefit of the Code is denied to renters.
Professors Moran and Whitford suggested that because African
Americans were more likely to fall in the lower strata of income levels,
the were disproportionately denied a benefit available, in theory, to
all. Thus far, Latinos would be treated no worse (or, alternatively, just
as harshly) as African Americans.
Professor Elizabeth Warren has also studied closely the phenomenon

CALIF. L. REV. 1315, 1331-44 (1997) (observing that it is a mistake to equate the Latino
experience with the African-American experience).
68. We might have added a sixth area of inquiry-the ability to take advantage of the
Code's incentives for capital investment.
69. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (describing qualified residence interest).
70. I.R.C. § 63(a) (deductions reduce taxable income).
71. Moran & Whitford, supra note 4, at 774-75.
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of homeownership by racial and ethnic groups. 72 Her study is partly
based on the idea that homeownership is a rough proxy for wealth. She
finds that the net worth of homeowners (median $171,700) far exceeds
the net worth of renters (median $4,800). Here, her finding is
consistent with Professors Moran and Whitford's view that the poor do
not share in the tax benefits associated with home ownership. 74 if
African Americans and Latinos are more likely to be among the poor, it
follows that the qualified residence interest deduction will, as a practical
matter, be largely unavailable to either group. Thus far, the effect of this
Code provision is an economically oriented one. This does not lessen
the discriminatory effect of such a provision on the poor, but as noted
above, this effect might be offset with the salutary effects of
encouraging home ownership and the aspiration of the American dream.
Professor Warren's findings, however, go further. First, she notes,
again perhaps unsurprisingly, that Latino homeownership rates are on
the order of 57% the rate of White homeownership rates.75 Professor
Warren's most surprising finding was that, for Whites, homeownership
equated with financial stability while for Latinos this was not the case.
She used the rates of bankruptcy filing to measure financial stability. 76
According to her, "White renters are about three times more likely to
file for bankruptcy than white homeowners." 77 For Latinos, by contrast,
the rates of bankruptcy filings between homeowners and renters were
about equal.78 Her conclusion is that Latino homeowners are much more
economically unstable than are their White counterparts. 9 She also
found that the bankruptcy filings of similarly situated African
Americans were slightly higher than were Latino bankruptcy filings.80
Professor Warren also discovered that the value of Latino homes
(median $92,000) was significantly less than the value of homes owned
by Whites (median $130,000).8 These data harmonize with Professor
Dorothy Brown's findings that while nearly 84% of Whites have wealth
attributed to the equity in their residence, only 61% of Blacks and 58%
of Latinos have such equity. 82 The value of this housing equity is
72. Warren, supranote 65, at 1778.
73. Id. at 1790.
74. Moran & Whitford, supra note 4, at 773-79.
75. Warren, supra note 65, at 1788. This rate approximated the African-American rate of
homeownership. Id.
76. Id. at 1789.
77. Id at 1790.
78. Id. at 1791.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions and Risk Aversion: The Influence of Race, Ethnicity,
and Class on Investor Behavior, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 385, 390 (2007).
82. Id. at 393-94.
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similarly disparate-the median value of White housing equity is more
than two and a half times Latino housing equity.83 The Pew Hispanic
Center observes that in 2004, Latino "homeowners, in fact, [had] a net
worth that is half again as high as the wealth of non-Hispanic
homeowners." 84 The conclusion is inescapable. To the extent that
homeownership is a measure of wealth and to the extent that the Code
encourages homeownership, the data suggests that Latinos are not
keeping pace. While we do not suggest wealth is the ultimate goal of
any group, sufficient wealth to see to the needs of one's family and to
see to the education of one's children is an important factor in social
mobility and in social stability.
While the findings above may not suggest a surprising result, the
point for our purposes is that, while African Americans and Latinos
may occupy the same rough income strata, each population must be
examined separately in order to pinpoint exactly how the Code affects
each. We aim for this demarcation in the material that follows.
B. Latinos and Pension Benefits
The relationship between Latinos and the Code is especially curious
in the context of pension plans. Here, the Code mechanism is more
intricate and requires some background. The Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) was enacted in 1974 to protect the rights
of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.8 5
ERISA provides a source of substantive law that broadly governs
employer-provided benefits, including pensions and healthcare. ERISA
does not require employers to provide their employees with pension
plans. Rather, ERISA creates a series of tax incentives under the income
tax system that encourages employers to provide pension plans and
encourages employees to participate in them.
Almost all pensions are provided by employers.87 Private pension

83. Id. at 394 (explaining the relatively higher rate of economic instability among Latino
homeowners. Their lower equity stake is a smaller cushion against income interruptions).
84. Press Release, Pew Hispanic Center, Wealth Gap Widens Between Whites and
Hispanics (Oct. 18, 2004), http://pewhispanic.org/newsroom/releases/release.php?ReleaselD
=15.
85. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 93 P.L. 406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2011)).
86. Befort, supra note 21, at 946. Although ERISA is a tax-oriented program, it is
overseen by both the Treasury Department and by the Department of Labor. This Department of
Labor responsibility is attributable to the labor roots of the employer-employee relationship.
Colleen E. Medill, Transforming the Role of the Social Security Administration, 92 CORNELL L.
REv. 323, 327 (2007).
87. Befort, supra note 21, at 945.
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plans came into being substantially after World War 11.88 The growth in
pension plans and the desire of employers to provide them to their
employees, though voluntary, was fueled by tax incentives and the hope
of attracting and retaining employees. 89 Over the years, however, the
incentives have changed and, with them, so has the range of pension
plans that are offered to employees.
When ERISA was enacted in the mid 1970s, "defined benefit"
pension plans dominated the landscape. 90 As the term suggests, defined
benefit pension plans provide for the payment of an annuity upon an
employee's retirement, the amount of which is based on years of service
and relative pay level. 91 In the 1980s, Congress decreased tax rates,
which in turn decreased the economic value of deductions. Congress
also effectively decreased the tax benefits associated with pension
benefits for highly compensated employees out of concern that ERISA
should benefit those at the lower rungs of the economic ladder. 92 This
discouraged defined benefit pension plans. 93 To fill the vacuum,
"defined contribution" pension plans became more prevalent.
Defined contribution plans are funded largely by an employee's taxdeductible contributions; although in some cases, emplo ers voluntarily
match at least part of the employee's contributions. With defined
contribution plans, an employer is freed of the risk of funding the
benefits of her employee's retirement. An employee is able to manage
his own finances and, importantly, the retirement fund that accrues is
"portable," allowing an employee to change employment without losing
the benefits of retirement.9 5 Of course, an employee's decision to
contribute to her own retirement under a defined contribution plan,
while encouraged by the income tax system through the use of
deductions, is voluntary. 96
Pension plans are almost always provided as an employee benefit.
However, not all employers provide pension plans. It is in this arena
that Latino reality is substantially different than that of Whites or
African Americans. Latino workers are the least likely of all racial and
ethnic groups to work for employers that provide pension plans. 9 7 In
2005, only some 37% of Latinos were covered by pension plans
88. Id. at 947.
89. Id.; Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Social Security Reforms: Lessons
from PrivatePensions,92 CORNELL L. REv. 297, 298 (2007).
90. Burke & McCouch, supranote 89, at 299; Medill, supra note 86, at 327.
91. Befort, supra note 21, at 946; Burke & McCouch, supranote 89, at 299-300.
92. Burke & McCouch, supranote 89, at 300.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 305-06; Befort, supranote 21, at 946.
95. Burke & McCouch, supra note 89, at 305-06.
96. Id. at 306.
97. Brown, supra note 81, at 390.
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compared to 65% of Whites, 57% of African-Americans, and 56% of
Asians and Native Americans. 98
The relatively small number of Latinos who are covered by pension
plans masks another reality. The trend from defined benefit plans to
defined contribution plans has created opportunity for funding
retirement but has shifted risk.99 In the case of defined benefit plans, an
employer has assumed the obligation, and risk, of funding retirement
benefits; in the case of a defined contribution pension plan, that risk is
shifted to the employee who must fund his own pension plan and accept
the consequences of unwise investment or a downturn in the economy.
The voluntariness of pension plan participation explains why less than
half of employees that are covered by employer-provided pension plans
actually participate in those pension plans.' 0 Unfortunately, most
Americans are not paying heed to any of this. A recent detailed study
suggests that Americans are not preparing well for their retirement
years. 0 1 The study's unsurprising conclusion is that wealthier
households are better prepared for retirement than poor households.1 02
Preparation for retirement is yet another measure of racial disparity
that traces its roots, in part, to the Code. Nearly half of Whites have
pensions from previous employers and well over half have income from
assets, but only about a fourth of Latinos have a private pension or
income from assets. 103 One of the major contributing factors in this
racial disparity of asset and savings possession is the
"overrepresentation [of Latinos] in low-wage service industry jobs and
or
labor-intensive occupations, which do not [generally] offer pensions
104
insurance."
retiree
supplemental
as
such
benefits
other retiree
Even among employees working for employers who sponsor pension
plans, Latinos are the least likely to actually participate in such plans. 0 5
The rates of Latino participation in pension plans are dismal. In 2005,
57% of White employees participated in their employer's plan, while
the percentages were 48% for Asians, 46% for Blacks, and only 29%
for Latinos. 6 The difference is "most dramatic" when examining

98. Id.
99. Eric M. Engen et al., Lifetime Earning,Social Security Benefits, and the Adequacy of
Retirement Wealth Accumulation, 66 Soc. SEC. BULL. 38, 38 (2005), available at http://ssa.gov/
policy/docs/ssb/v66n l/v66nlp38.html.
100. Berfort, supra note 21, at 948.
101. See Engen et al., supra note 99, at 38.
102. Id. at 46.
103. Steven P. Wallace & Valentine M. Villa, Equitable Health Systems: Cultural and
StructuralIssuesfor Latino Elders, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 247, 261-62 (2003).
104. Id. at 262.
105. Brown, supra note 81, at 390.
106. Id.
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pension wealth disparities by race.' 0 7 Using defined benefit and defined
contribution wealth measures from 1992, the median value of pension
wealth is $37,721 for Whites and $24,076 for Blacks, and $0 for
Latinos.s0 8 In 1998, the median Latino family wealth, excluding home
equity, was still zero.10 9 As the material that follows demonstrates, this
kind of disparity is pervasive.
This racial disparity is evident in related pension and non-housing
equity areas as well. Fifty percent of Whites own tax-favored Individual
Retirement Accounts or Keogh accounts, while just 15% of Blacks, and
12% of Latinos own such accounts.1 10 Similarly, over 90% of Whites
own liquid assets, while 60% of Blacks, and 53% of Latinos own these
types of assets."' The racial gap in non-housing equity is even more
striking in light of the value of such equity: the median value of White
non-housing equity is almost eleven times the median value of Latino
non-housing equity.11 2 These disparities persist even when controlling
for income level and educational attainment." 3
Although the relatively low level of Latino participation in pension
plans disproportionately excludes them from the associated tax benefits,
Latinos are also excluded from the tax benefits associated with housing
equity and other asset acquisition. Again, while we do not suggest
wealth is the ultimate goal of any group, we again want to emphasize
our point that sufficient wealth to see to the needs of one's own family
and to see to the education of one's children is an important factor in
107. Id. at 391.
108. Id. A median describes not an average (the mean) but rather the most common data
point. Thus the reason why there is zero median pension wealth for Latinos is because within
the data sample, only 47% of Latinos own any pension wealth. In other words, more Latinos
have a $0 value than not, so the median must be $0. In contrast, 79% and 66% of Whites and
Blacks respectively own pension wealth in this sample, which is why their median pension
wealth is above zero.
109. From 1992 to 2010 employee participation in defined befefit plans declined from
93% to 87% and employee participation in defined contribution plans increased from 9% to
19%. Employee Benefit Research Institute, Chapter 4: Participation in Employee Benefit
Programs, EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS (July 2008), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/

publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter/2004.pdf. In the same period, the personal savings
rate as a percentage of disposable income declined from a relative high of 7.3% in 1992 to a
relative low of 1.4% in 2005 before rebounding somewhat to 5.8% in 2010. Employee Benefit
Research Institute, Chapter 9: Personal Savings, EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

(May 2011), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/databook/DB.Chapter/2009.pdf. Not
surprisingly, Latinos have not seen much in wealth accumulation I this same period. Eric
Rodriguez & Deirdre Martinez, Pension Coverage: A Mission Step in the Wealth-Building
Ladder for Latinos, 11 NCLR ISSUE BRIEF 16 (2004), http://issuu.com/nclr/docs/1388-file
ib I lpensioncoverage?mode=window&pageNumber-1 6.
110. Idat396.
S11l.Id. at 395.
112. Id. at 394.
113. Seeid.at398-401.
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social mobility and social stability.
C. The Undocumented
The Latino population in the United States is heavily represented by
immigrants, including undocumented immigrants. 114 Professor Francine
J. Lipman has undertaken a comprehensive look at the taxation of
undocumented immigrants." 5 She has observed that undocumented
immigrants contribute more to the economy than they consume.1 6 She
also reminds us that the U.S. Supreme Court has echoed this view.
The Court, she notes, stated in Plyler v. Doe:
[T]here is no evidence . . . suggesting that illegal entrants impose
any significant burden on the State's economy. To the contrary,
the available evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize
public services, while contributing their labor to the local
economy and tax money to the state fisc." 8
However, even without federal or state legislation barring
undocumented immigrants from receiving public benefits, the
undocumented use or apply for public services at relatively low rates.
For example, undocumented immigrants are overwhelmingly uninsured
and tend not to seek out regular or preventive healthcare-let alone
Medicare or Medicaid funding for healthcare-due to language barriers,
lack of knowledge about the U.S. healthcare system, and fear of
detection by immigration authorities. 119
114. Lipman, supra note 11, at 10. The overwhelming majority of the almost 14 million
undocumented U.S. residents are Latino. By comparison, there were nearly 42 million Latinos
in the United States in 2005. Hispanics,supra note 39.
115. Lipman, supra note 11 passim; see Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-RelatedState and
Local Ordinances:Preemption, Prejudice, and the ProperRole for Enforcement, U. CHI. LEGAL
F., 27, 33-34 (2007) (state, county and local ordinances regulating immigration functions can
also implicate tax issues).
116. Lipman, supra note 11, at 2. The amount collected is substantial. See A. Michael
Froomkin, Creating a Viral Federal Privacy Standard,48 B.C. L. REv. 55, 85 (2007) ("The
SSA collects $ 17 billion per year in payroll tax payments for which valid SSNs cannot be found
. . . ."). To support her premise, Professor Lipman cites a large number of scholars, among them
Professor Michael A. Olivas who has long spoken against the demonization of the
undocumented so prevalent in today's political discourse. Lipman, supra note 11, at 1 (citing
Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage
Classifications,35 VA. J.INT'L L. 217, 220, 227-34 (1994-1995) (describing the twisted analysis
of data to support the false conclusion that undocumented immigrants "drain-the-fisc").
117. Lipman, supra note 11, at 2 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982)).
118. Id.
119. Jeffrey T. Kullgren, Restrictions on Undocumented Immigrants' Access to Health
Services: The Public Health Implications of Welfare Reform, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1630, 1630
(2003).
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The disproportionate impact of the Code on low-income individuals
and families is particularly severe for undocumented families who are
often inhibited from sending their children to college, and are
consequently limited in their generational social mobility. To understate
the problem, undocumented families, headed by parents who usually
work low-paying jobs, are often too poor to afford a college education.
Because of their immigration status, undocumented students are also
ineligible for financial aid in the form of state or federal grants and
loans for college. 120 Despite the increasing rate at which undocumented
immigrants are filing tax returns,121 it is likely that many do not claim or
are ineligible for the tax benefits associated with higher education. The
fear of being detected by immigration authorities may be deterrent
enough from claiming and pursuing tax credits and deductions, but
many undocumented families and students may not even know that
higher education tax benefits exist. The statutory requirements for
claiming the credit are extremely complex and this fact may discourage
claims by families in which no one has ever attended college-a likely
circumstance in the case of undocumented Latinos.122
If the undocumented receive less in federal tax funded benefits than
they contribute in taxes paid, tax policy underlying benefit theory is
turned on its head. The argument would be easy to make that by
following such a policy, the United States is exploiting the benefit
theory shortfall at the expense of the undocumented. Professor
Lipman's view is that "Congress could not have intended that the
poorest working families pay more than their more fortunate working
colleagues.'1 23 Whether Congress has the will to remedy the problem is
difficult to predict. It may very well be that this is a Latino reality that
will be among the last to fade from the landscape.
D. The Tax Benefits Associated With Higher Education
We have noted that despite Latino contribution to the fisc, "Latinos
are more likely to live in poverty than non-Latinos and they are
120. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. §
1623 (2006). Some states have filled the gap, enacting legislation that allows undocumented
students to be eligible for receiving "in-state" tuition aid. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5
(West 2011).
121. See Bernstein, supra note 40, at Al.
122. See generally Andrew D. Pike, No Wealthy ParentLeft Behind: An Analysis of Tax
Subsidiesfor HigherEducation, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1229 (2007). Sadly, aware of their limited
opportunities for higher education, many undocumented students drop out before finishing high
school. See generally Victor C. Romero, Postsecondary School Education Benefits for
Undocumented Immigrants: Promises and Pitfalls, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 393, 395
(2002).
123. Lipman, supra note 11, at 57.
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employed in low-wage jobs." 24 This is a disadvantage in and of itself;
however, available data also show an alarming situation with respect to
education. Latinos lag behind Whites and African Americans in
educational achievement by a significant margin.125 Latinos also have
the highest dropout and illiteracy rates.126 One study found that in 1990,
the Latino dropout rate was an astounding 32.4% while the
corresponding rate among African Americans was 13.25% and among
Whites was 9%.127 More recent data is not as dramatic but is
nonetheless compelling. In 2006, the Latino dropout rate was 22.1%
while the corresponding rate among African-Americans was 10.7% and
among Whites was 5.8%.128 These dismal statistics are made yet worse
because Latinos are also less likely to pursue higher education. 29
What does all of this mean in the context of the Code? Two points
might be made. First, we add our voices to the many that have argued
that the sociological implications of a significant Latino education gap
cannot be ignored. 130 Second, the Code is complicit in exacerbating the
Latino education gap. There exist myriad Code provisions designed to
provide exclusions from income, tax credits, and other tax benefits
related to expenses incurred in connection with the pursuit of higher
education that are effectively denied to the Latino populace.13 1 These
benefits provided to students of the parents of U.S. citizens are denied
to Latinos by reason of low income levels and undocumented status
that, as a practical matter, do not allow for the exploitation of these
benefits. They are also denied by reason of the relatively small number
of Latinos who pursue higher education. This kind of disparity is
124.

Ana M. Martinez-Aleman, Latino Demographics, Democratic Individuality, and

EducationalAccountability: A Pragmatist'sView, 35 EDUC. RESEARCHER 25, 26.
125.

ANTONIA

DARDER ET AL.,

LATINOS

AND EDUCATION:

A

CRITICAL READER

53

(Routledge 1992); see generally Robles, supra note 57, at 178-79 (describing low educational
attainment by Latinos).
126.

DARDER ET AL., supra note 125.

127.

NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2011, at 218,

availableat http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011033.pdf.
128. Id.
129. Martinez-Aleman, supra note 124, at 27. It does not make it any easier to deal with
this problem when we discover that this disparity may very well be the result of systematic
discrimination in the provision of basic educational opportunity. See Michael A. Olivas, Brown
and the DesegregativeIdeal: Location, Race, and College Attendance Policies, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 391,408-09 (2005) (describing the effects of dejure discrimination).
130.

Martinez-Aleman, supra note 124, at 27. See also EDUCATION LAW STORIES (Michael

A. Olivas & R.G. Schneider eds., 2007); Martinez-Aleman, supra note 124, at 25; Kevin R.
Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me a River: The Limits of a "Systematic Analysis of
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools," 7 AFR.-Am. L. & POL'Y REP. 1 (2005); DARDER
ET AL., supra note 125, at 58.

131. See Martinez-Aleman, supra note 124, at 27 ("Latinos ... are less likely to pursue
higher education").
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especially insidious as it offers little in the way of ending the cycle in
which those at the low end of the socioeconomic scale are not provided
the means by which to escape the drag caused by low educational
attainment. Higher education tax policy, it seems, ill-serves Latinos.
E. The EarnedIncome Tax Credit
The disparities among Latinos, African Americans, and Whites
under the Code are also shown in connection with the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC), by which those with earned income below a certain
threshold are provided a refundable tax credit.' 32 Like the deduction for
the payment of qualified residence interest, the EITC has a non-revenue
generating purpose-it was envisioned as a work-incentive program
that was a preferable alternative to welfare.' 3 3 The EITC 1,rovides a
means for the working poor to lift themselves out of poverty.
The expectation here is that all of the poor eligible for the EITC
would be homogenous-the poor could be expected to use, or not use,
the EITC at the same rates without regard to race or ethnicity. Here, the
data are surprising. Professor Dorothy Brown has discovered that more
than half of EITC eligible taxpayers are White and that Latinos are "less
likely than whites or blacks to know about the EITC."'3 5 Indeed poor
undocumented immigrants are ineligible for most public assistance
132. I.R.C. § 32 (2011) (describing the earned income credit).
133. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Welfare By Any Other Name; Tax Transfers and the EITC, 56
AM. U. L. REv. 1261, 1266 (2007). The EITC is not without its critics. For example, one of its
difficulties is that while it is aimed at the working poor, the benefits accrue to the poor who are
paid as opposed to the unpaid working poor. Id. at 1270-71.
134. Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 CoLUM. L. REv. 790,
792 (2007).
135. Id. at 821 n.197 (emphasis added) (citing Katherine Ross Phillips, Who Knows About
the Earned Income Tax Credit? I URBAN INST. (Jan. 1, 2001), http://www.urban.org(Uploaded
PDF/anf b27.pdf). Professor Dorothy Brown further observes in a table of EITC eligible
taxpayers that less than 20% of those are Latino. Id. at 821. See Elaine Maag, Disparities in
Knowledge of the EITC, 106 TAx NOTES 1323, 1323 (Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.taxpolicy
center.org/publications/urlprint.cfn?ID=1000752 ("Only a small portion (27.1 percent) of lowincome Hispanic parents know about the EITC-significantly less than their peers of other races
and ethnicities."); Robles, supra note 57, at 181-82 ("Although the EITC has been successful in
providing substantial economic relief to a growing segment of the U.S. population and although
Latinos are eligible for the EITC, Hispanics are least likely to be aware of this refunded tax
credit and less likely to claim it compared to whites and blacks."). The Urban Institute mentions
that 18.4% of low income Hispanic parents have ever received the EITC, which is well below
the average of all low income parents. Phillips, supra, at 4. Moreover, 47.2% of non-Hispanic
non-U.S. citizens have heard of the EITC, while only 16.5% of Hispanic non-U.S. citizens have
heard of it. Id. at 5. The undocumented do not qualify for the EITC and one undocumented
family member taints the entire household. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(E) (requiring a taxpayer
identification number in order to be eligible); see Lipman, supra note 43, at 745-46 (the EITC is
denied to workers who are not authorized to work in the United States).
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programs, including tax relief. As such, they pay federal, state and local
income, property, excise, and sales taxes at exceptionally high effective

marginal tax rates. 13 6
The irony of the EITC is twofold. First, Professor Dorothy Brown
notes that the EITC lifts more children out of poverty than any other
government program.' 3 7 If the EITC is intended to have such salutary
effects, it would seem that these salutary effects should be distributed in
an equitable manner. Unfortunately, the percentage of Latinos who have
actually received the EITC is also less than half of the percentage of
African Americans and Whites who have received the EITC. 138 These
results should be as appalling to policymakers as it is to those who are
shortchanged. Second, the EITC is extraordinarily complex1 3 9 but is
aimed at a segment of the population that, on balance, is likely to be less
educated than the general populace.
All of this makes for an interesting dilemma. We recognize that the
EITC has accomplished a lot. Indeed, the cost of administering the
EITC is significantly less than the cost of administering the Food Stamp
Program or other traditional welfare programs.140 Moreover,
participation rates are higher with the EITC than they are with other
programs.141 However, Professor Joseph Dodge makes the point that:
"[T]he burden of attaining distributive justice through government
action would fall primarily (if not exclusively) on the spending side, not
136. Lipman, supra note 43, at 743 (discussing that undocumented immigrants are
ineligible for tax relief programs and as such they pay exceptionally high effective marginal tax
rates for federal, state and local income, property, excise and sales taxes).
137. Brown, supra note 134, at 792.
138.

STEVE HOLT, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AT AGE 30: WHAT WE KNow 12 (Feb.

2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ Files/rc/reports/2006/02childrenfamilies
holt/20060209 Holt.pdf (Spanish speakers claim EITC at lower rates than others and only 15%
of Latino low-income parents reported receiving the Federal EITC in 2002); Phillips, supra note
135, at 4 (outlining ethnic differences in knowledge about the EITC and receipt of the EITC).
The following table, which tracks low income taxpayers who are among those eligible for the
EITC, is abridged from the original:

Percentage who have heard about the EITC
Percentage who have received the EITC

Latino
32
18

African Amer.
72.7
48

White
75.9
53.1

Id. at 5.
139. Brown, supra note 134, at 793. Professor Dorothy Brown observes that the IRS
publication that is intended to assist taxpayer understanding of the EITC "is overfifty pages long
with six separate worksheets." Id. (emphasis added). We address the problem of access to
knowledge and information in Part IV.
140. Ventry, supra note 133, at 1265 (cost of EITC is less than 2% of benefits compared to
20-25% for Food Stamps and 10% for welfare programs).
141. Id. (EITC participation rates are as high as 85% while Food Stamp participation is on
the order of 70%).
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on the taxing side." 142 Thus, a mechanism by which the poor, including
Latinos, were lifted out of poverty by means of spending might well be
more effective. "It would be generally sufficient that tax rules did not
thwart or undermine spending programs."l 4 3
Moreover, the relative cost of administering the EITC is largely
shifted to the taxpayer.'" At best, this is not a happy result.
Professor Brown suggests that only when popular perception of the
EITC is such that it benefits primarily Whites will its complexity be
addressed and will audit rates decrease.145 The not-so-subtle subtext of
her suggestion is that the EITC's complexity and the associated high
audit rates have a decidedly racial aspect.146

IV. EDUCATION

OF THE POPULACE AND THE POLICYMAKERS

We are mindful of the power of information. One commentator has
noted that "[t]ax systems . . . empower only those who can take

advantage of the tax benefits." 47 In order to take advantage of tax
benefits, a taxpayer must not only reach a certain income level, 148a
taxpayer must also know about the tax benefits. We believe information
about rights and government processes in general should be available to
everyone, including Spanish speakers, in the United States. Our view is
underscored by the Voting Rights Act, which requires that voting
materials in minority languages be made available to applicable
language minority groups.' Implicit in the Voting Rights Act is the
notion that effective and responsible participation in democracy requires
a basic understanding of the mechanisms of the electoral process. 5 0 It
strikes us that the extraordinary complexity of the Code alone would
justify the availability of materials in minority languages.' 5 ' In this
142. Id.; Dodge, supra note 33, at 452.
143. Id.
144. Francine J. Lipman, The Working Poor are Payingfor Government Benefits: Fixing
the Hole in the Anti-Poverty Purse,2003 Wis. L. REv. 461, 466-67 (2003).
145. Brown, supra note 134, at 798-99 (building on Derrick Bell's interest convergence
theory).
146. See id.
147. Uy, supra note 5, at 119.
148. Id.
149. Section 4(f)(4) of the Voting Rights Act codified as amended at U.S.C.A. § 1973aala (West 2011), require that when a covered state of political subdivision: "[P]rovides any
registration or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information
relating to the electoral process, including ballots, it shall provide them in the language of the
applicable language minority group as well as in the English language."
150. As more eloquently phrased in the context of illiteracy, "[a]n illiterate population can
neither work effectively nor participate in democracy." DARDER ET AL., supra note 125, at 58.
151. We invite the reader to search "tax loopholes" on google.com (last visited Oct. 11,
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respect, the Internal Revenue Service has commendably made tax
information, forms, and publications in Spanish.152 Still, there remains
concern that more must be done to educate Latinos as to the availability
of the EITC so those who are eligible actually receive the intended
benefit.
We also are mindful of the insidious effect of subtle forms of
discrimination. In this regard, we take our cue from Professor Zelenak
who suggests a multi-step approach that begins with the inquiry as to
whether a particular Code provision was intended to have a disparate
impact, and whether there exists a legitimate purpose for the
provision.15 3 While we think that in the majority of cases, the answer
would be no to the former question and yes to the latter question, we are
open to persuasion. We leave the final step of Professor Zelenak's
approach-finding "the best balance between eliminating or
ameliorating the adverse impact, and serving the provision's legitimate
purpose" 5 4-to the new Congress.
To be sure, it may be that any tax system will always have its
winners and losers. Perhaps, for that reason, distributive justice may
very well be best accomplished by focusing not on the system itself but
rather on programs that can, in some positive way, accomplish the
social goals not well-suited for the tax system.15 5 One candidate for this
program would be concerted education regarding the tax system aimed
at Latino and other minority populations. As we mentioned above, only
a small percentage of low-income Latino parents even know about the
EITC, let alone receive it.156
The knowledge necessary to become tax literate depends on the
mastery of basic financial principles and exposure to their
application.' 57 In the case of Latinos, this familiarity may be difficult to
acquire. This knowledge is certainly not widely available and, as one
scholar observes, financial skills, including knowledge of tax benefits,
"are often overlooked as a component in financial education curricula
and outreach."l 59 Those who have the opportunity to improve this
aspect of their education will gain the means to break the cycle of
2011). Our attempt returned 1,009,000 hits. This is not a frivolous exercise. It invites the
question as to who has access to such information. We think it is those rich enough to have
computers, those who speak English, and those who can read.
152. Internal Revenue Service, El IRS en Espaflol, IRS.Gov, http://www.irs.gov/espanol/
(last visited Sept. 24, 2011).
153. Zelenak, supra note 46, at 1575.
154. Id.
155. See Dodge, supra note 33, at 451-52.
156. Brown, supra note 134, at 821 n.197.
157. See Robles, supra note 57, at 181.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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dependency on the EITC, and can ultimately take advantage of the
largess provided in the Code.160
In the case of the Code, obligations and benefits should be made
well-known to Spanish speakers. This is neither a trivial concern nor is
it an unambitious goal. The effects could be tremendous. According to
the 2000 census, there are 28.1 million native Spanish speakers living in
the United States: this number includes 14.3 million who reported that
they spoke English "very well" and 13.8 million who reported that they
spoke English "less than very well." 6 1 Despite this language barrier,
Latinos have growing political clout and contribute a significant portion
of the tax revenue, even if some are undocumented.162
We are driven by Professor Marjorie Kornhauser's eloquence in
describing the challenges that we as Latinos face:
[W]e must constantly be aware that the tax laws reflect social and
political choices, not just economic ones, and that all these
choices have different impacts on different groups. Our
awareness of these facts can help us deal with any resultant
inequities ... through the tax code. . 163
CONCLUSION

At bottom, "it remains important not to lose sight" of the effect of
public policy choices.164 In the case of the Code, we take pains to
emphasize that public policy choices, in the guise of tax statutes appear
neutral in their application, can have profound effects on the future of
Latinos. Ultimately, randomized justice is a poor proxy for more precise
fairness. Conscious and transparent decision-making must permeate the
inevitable policy choices and tradeoffs inherent in the Code. It is with
this spirit that we proceded with our critique, mindful that minimization
of racial and ethnic inequities in the Code can only lead to greater tax
compliance.
While it is tempting to develop the theme that a tax structure that
caters to the majority is inherently discriminatory, it would then have to
follow that no tax structure could pass muster as being truly equitable.
The principle of horizontal equity is inherently suspect, not because it
160. Id. at 187.
161. Id. at 178.
162. Hyon B. Shin & Rosalind Bruno, Language Use and English Speaking Ability: 2000,
U.S. CENSUS 2000, at 2 (Oct. 2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf.
163. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Through the Looking Glass with Alice and Larry: The
NatureofScholarship,76 N.C. L. REv. 1609, 1627 (1998).
164. See Olivas, supra note 129, at 415.
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fails as an ideal, but rather because the idea of treating similarly situated
persons similarly may be an impossible task.165 A second problem is
that in attempting a truly horizontally equitable tax system, there might
be a tendency to subordinate that cultural identity, which makes us
unique.166 As Dr. Ana Martinez Aleman observes, by disregarding
individuality, "we invoke one of the paradoxes of American democracy:
the belief and confidence in the individual and the coincident disregard
for an individual's reality."l 67
Accordingly, the analysis of whether Latinos are ill-treated under the
Code must necessarily depend on notions of distributive justice. While
tax policy theorists may balk at such an approach, distributive principles
have always permeated the Internal Revenue Code. Latino demographic
realities make this reality too hard to ignore. This is demonstrated by the
increasing economic clout of Latinos in this country coupled with the
persistent asymmetric distribution of tax benefits among all ethnic and
racial groups. Finally, reducing this inherent unfairness will also serve
the utilitarian purpose mentioned at the start of our analysis-making
the Code fair facilitates tax collection.

165.
166.
constrain
167.

See Martinez, supra note 2, at 424 n.60.
See Martinez-Aleman, supra note 124, at 25 (discussing educational programs that
individuality).
Id.

